Hum Stud
DOI 10.1007/s10746-014-9339-8

THEORETICAL / PHILOSOPHICAL PAPER

Between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics: Paul Ricoeur's Philosophy of Imagination

Saulius Geniusas

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract I argue that imagination has an inherently paradoxical structure: it enables one to flee one's socio-cultural reality and to constitute one's socio-cultural world. I maintain that most philosophical accounts of the imagination leave this paradox unexplored. I further contend that Paul Ricoeur is the only thinker to have addressed this paradox explicitly. According to Ricoeur, to resolve this paradox, one needs to recognize language as the origin of productive imagination. This paper explores Ricoeur's solution by offering a detailed study of reproductive and productive imagination in the framework of poetic imagination. My analysis subjects Ricoeur's distinction between reproductive and productive imagination to a critique that relies upon the principles of classical phenomenology. According to my central thesis, the imaginative powers of language are themselves rooted in perception. This thesis broadens the scope and significance of Ricoeur's solution by enabling one to resolve the paradox of imagination not only at the level of language-based imagination, but also at the level of dreams and daydreaming as well as at the level of non-language based art. No less significantly, this thesis enables one to open a fresh dialogue between phenomenology and hermeneutics.

Keywords Productive and reproductive imagination · Phenomenology · Hermeneutics · Metaphor · Fiction

This paper is guided by six tasks. I will begin by addressing the pervasive fear of imagination, which is especially prevalent in the framework of the political, religious, and socio-cultural imaginary. Secondly, with the aim of disclosing the reasons that underlie this fear, I will highlight imagination's seemingly paradoxical

S. Geniusas (✉)
Department of Philosophy, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 4/F, Fung King Hey Building, Shatin, New Territories, Hong Kong
e-mail: geniusas@cuhk.edu.hk

Published online: 20 December 2014

structure. I will argue that imagination opens a path that leads the subject in two opposite directions. On the one hand, it provides the subject with the freedom to flee the surroundings it inhabits and thereby marks the greatest distance the subject can consciously take towards the world. On the other hand, imagination provides the subject with the powers needed to refashion its surroundings, i.e., to constitute as well as reconstitute its socio-cultural world. Thirdly, I will contend that most philosophical analyses of the imagination leave this apparent paradox unexplored. I will further maintain that insofar as this paradox remains unsettled, we are left with a truncated account of imagination. Fourthly, I will argue that Paul Ricoeur is the only thinker to have addressed the paradoxical structure of imagination explicitly. So as to substantiate this claim, I will focus on Ricoeur's critique of the reproductive model of imagination and on his own alternative—the hermeneutical account of productive imagination. Fifthly, I will subject Ricoeur's conception of productive imagination to a critique that relies upon the principles of classical phenomenology. The goal of this critique is to open a path to a more comprehensive understanding of the paradox in question. Finally, I will conclude by spelling out some implications that follow from such a phenomenological engagement in Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination.

The Fear of Imagination

Consider the following anecdote regarding the likely destiny of books and films, which address sensitive themes in too imaginative a way. In 1953, Nikos Kazantsakis published *The Last Temptation of Christ* (1998). This novel depicts Jesus Christ less as a god and more as a human, a person free from sin, yet filled with passions, temptations, doubts, reluctance, depression, and lust. Because of this and other literary achievements, in 1957 the Society of Greek Writers recommended Kazantsakis for the Nobel Prize in Literature. For better or worse, Kazantsakis lost the Prize to Albert Camus, although by just one vote. Subsequently Camus was to observe that Kazantsakis deserved the honor a hundred times more than himself. The Roman Catholic Church also paid the author of *The Last Temptation of Christ* the honor he apparently deserved. Because of the novel's human, all-too-human, depiction of Christ, in 1954—just 1 year after its publication—the Church placed the work in the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, thereby, of course, contributing significantly to the novel's growing popularity.

1988 marked the appearance of Martin Scorcese's screen adaptation of this novel. The film bore the same title as the novel and its destiny was no different. Before its official release, the film was met with strong opposition from some religious communities, and especially from Bill Bright's Campus Crusade for Christ.[1] The protests continued into the late 1990s and the public outrage took place

[1] After viewing the film before its official screening, Bill Bright offered to reimburse Universal Studios for all its investments into *The Last Temptation* in exchange for all existing prints, which he vowed to destroy.

in virtually all the corners of the world. The film was banned, at least for some time, in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Mexico did not even screen the film. Because of the massive protests organized by the Russian Orthodox Church, the screening of the film on Russian television was blocked on two separate occasions, until in November of 1997, the representatives of the NTV Channel announced that they would no longer be intimidated: "The real problem lies not in the temptation of Christ, but in the temptation of top clergymen," they then declared. In 1992 the film's screening was cancelled in South Africa during a film festival, using death threats against its organizers. In France, an arsonist set fire to a theater showing the film, while in Greece, the screening of the film sparked violence, thereby giving rise to the subsequent ban of the film (see Green and Karolides 2009).

The destiny of *The Last Temptation of Christ* is not exceptional. The abundant cases of censorship mark this anecdote as a rather standard occurrence, and it is precisely the common fate of this work that should give pause. What do examples such as this one tell us about imagination? What is this secret force that imagination must possess if it is to provoke such uncompromising forms of resistance?

The Paradox of Irreality

This anecdote brings to light two conflicting tendencies of the imagination. On the one hand, imagination can be identified with the innocent capacity to intend either non-existent or absent objects, which remain cut off from our actual surroundings. It enables us to escape the confines of everyday reality, thereby freeing us from the bondage to our surroundings and transferring us to non-existent worlds, which are entirely cut off from actuality. Because of this tendency of the imagination, anyone who finds the described cases of censorship disturbing would argue that the ultimate force of imagination lies in its capacity to empower the subject with a profound sense of freedom, which is strong enough to break the limits of what is actual and what is real. Taking the innocence of this freedom into account, it is hard not to see the described cases of censorship as gratuitous cases of violence against human nature. In what follows, I will call this element *the utopian tendency of imagination*: what is given in imagination remains without place within the horizon of actuality.

On the other hand, besides enabling the subject to escape the boundaries of actuality, imagination also empowers the subject to (re)constitute her surrounding world. If following the first tendency, one could liken an imaginative experience to a dream, then with the second tendency in mind, one could further say that the dream in question is not content to remain in a dreamlike state—it strives to be realized. Imagination puts into question what presently exists, it provides the incentive to (re)constitute the subject's socio-historical reality. Imagination is thus by far not innocent. Rather, its tremendous force, and thus potentially its danger, lies in its capacity to (re)shape the very world that embraces our everyday actions, feelings, and thoughts. I will call this tendency *the constitutive tendency of imagination*.

Imagination thus embodies the tendency to flee the world and the tendency to shape it. Yet are these two tendencies compatible with each other? How can one and the same power enable one to escape and to build, to flee and to form, to suspend and to constitute? With these questions, we stumble against an apparent paradox, which I will call *the paradox of irreality*: we cannot doubt that imaginary objects are irreal even though we simultaneously recognize imagination's capacity to transform reality.

How exactly are we to understand this paradox? It should not be understood as a suggestion that we face here a contradiction, whose resolution comes at a price of cancelling one of the above-mentioned tendencies. Rather, we face here a paradox similar to what Husserl identified as the paradox of subjectivity, which he addressed in §53 and §54 of the *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Husserl writes:

> How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity, constitute the whole world, namely, constitute it as its intentional formation, one which has always already become what it is and continues to develop, formed by the universal interconnection of intentionally accomplishing subjectivity, while the latter, the subjects accomplishing in cooperation, are themselves only a partial formation within the total accomplishment? The subjective part of the world swallows up, so to speak, the whole world and thus itself too. What an absurdity! (1970: 179f.)

We face a similar dilemma: how can imagination place the subject outside the world as well as in the world? "What an absurdity!" However, just as in the case of the paradox of subjectivity, so also in the case of the paradox of irreality, the task is not to resolve the paradox, but to recognize that it is necessary and thus irremovable. More precisely, the task is to realize that the seemingly irreconcilable determinations belong to the very essence of the phenomenon under scrutiny. Thus to bring up the paradox of irreality is not to suggest that imagination cannot perform such two apparently contradictory roles. Rather, just as in the case of the paradox of subjectivity, in our case also the task is to interpret the apparent paradox as a transcendental clue, which can generate an insight into the essential structure of the phenomenon. What can the paradox in question tell us about imagination? What must imagination be like if it is to appear to us in such a seemingly paradoxical form? With these questions in mind, it becomes important to see how the paradox of irreality has been addressed in phenomenological accounts of the imagination.

Utopian and Constitutive Tendencies: Sartre, Castoriadis, and Ricoeur

In the present context, only a cursory look at the historical development of phenomenological accounts of imagination is possible. One could read the whole historical development of the phenomenological accounts of imagination as a continuous shifting of attention from one tendency of imagination to the other. While Edmund Husserl's (2005) and Jean-Paul Sartre's (1962, 2004) contributions

in an unprecedented way highlight imagination's utopian tendency, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (1993a, b), Gaston Bachelard's (1994) as well as Cornelius Castoriadis' (1997) accounts underscore the constitutive tendency.

Sartre's classical studies of imagination represent the utopian tendency most forcefully. Yet by conceptualizing imagination in terms of its capacity to reach out for non-existent objects, absent objects, objects that exist elsewhere, or objects whose existence is neutralized (2004: 12), Sartre has in effect suppressed the constitutive tendency of imagination. Indeed, in *Imagination* and in *The Imaginary*—the two works that are exclusively dedicated to the analysis of the imagination—Sartre interprets imagination as an escapist tendency to flee from actual problems and from the need to resolve them. Imagination here is all too similar to bad faith, which initiates a flight from facticity and liberates one from responsibility. In Sartre's last work, *The Family Idiot*, we come across such a notion of imagination in the figure of Flaubert, who being incapable of modifying his worldly circumstances, falls back upon an imaginary solution to his difficulties.

As Thomas Busch has pointed out in his analysis of Sartre's and Ricoeur's philosophies of imagination, besides such an escapist notion of imagination, in such works as *What is Literature* and "A Plea for Intellectuals," Sartre presents us with a significantly different understanding of imagination, which intimates that even though there is no prose without imagination, prose does not fall victim to the escapist tendency that lies at the heart of other arts, such as poetry, painting, and music. As Busch points out, "[u]nlike the poet, the prose writer employs words as signs directing the reader to clear meanings in the process of communicating a judgment about this world. Literature lifts life from the inchoate level of the lived to the thematic" (1997: 512).

Beata Stawarska corroborates such a position when she argues that Sartre's philosophy of the imagination relies upon two significantly different sources. Besides offering a pictorial theory of imagination, which draws its inspiration from Husserl's phenomenology, Sartre also conceptualizes imagination as spontaneous and self-determined, and this conception relies upon Pierre Janet's work on obsessive patients (see Stawarska 2005: 133–153). So also, Lior Levy maintains that not just reproductive but also productive imagination plays a significant role in Sartre's work, notably in his account of aesthetic experience (see Levy 2014: 43–60).[2] With these analyses in mind, let us admit that Sartre presents us with two significantly different conceptions of imagination. Using the terminology I have employed above, let me further characterize these conceptions as utopian and constitutive. Yet we are still left with a question: what exactly is the relation between these two significantly different notions of imagination? In Sartre's works, this question remains unexplored.

[2] Here Levy was led to the conclusion that Ricoeur's critique of Sartre's philosophy of the imagination, which focuses only on reproductive imagination, remains partial and unconvincing. In contrast to Ricoeur's reading of Sartre, Levy proceeds to demonstrate that Sartre develops a notion of productive imagination. Furthermore, she also suggests that Sartre develops a notion of narrative identity well before Ricoeur and that much like Ricoeur, Sartre also conceives of selfhood as inseparable from imagination.

In contrast to Sartre, Cornelius Castoriadis—one of the most forceful representatives of what I have called the constitutive tendency—thematizes imagination almost exclusively as a *vis formandi,* which underlies all other human activities, experiences, and thoughts. "To put it bluntly," writes Castoriadis, "it is because radical imagination exists that 'reality' exists *for us*—exists *tout court*—and exists *as* it exists" (1997: 321). Castoriadis draws a distinction between two fundamental forms of radical imagination—the imagination of a singular human being and the social imaginary. Following two paths—a psychoanalytic and a philosophical—he argues that what makes imagination radical is the very fact that it creates *ex nihilo*. Yet just as Sartre's strong emphasis on utopian imagination came along with the recognition of the constitutive powers of imagination, so also, Castoriadis' focus on radical imagination does not make him lose sight of reproductive imagination. Castoriadis explicitly opposes radical imagination to what he calls "secondary imagination"—a concept that encompasses imitative, reproductive, and simply combinatory imagination.[3] Nonetheless, the question concerning the exact relation of these two types of imagination remains in Castoriadis' works unexplored. Thus just as Sartre, Castoriadis also leaves us wondering, are we justified in thinking of imagination as a unified concept? Shouldn't we rather concede that this term is a homonym which covers both creative and recreative capacities that manifest themselves at both the individual and at the social levels?

Thus by focusing on one dimension of the imagination, both Sartre and Castoriadis, although in diametrically opposite ways, have suppressed its other dimension. In this regard they both represent a tendency which is deeply entrenched in highly diverse philosophies of imagination. It would hardly be an exaggeration to suggest that a large majority of available philosophical reflections on imagination tend to focus either on the utopian, or the constitutive, dimension. Because of such an exclusive focus, these accounts do not clarify the full-fledged phenomenon of imagination.

Within such a context, Paul Ricoeur's phenomenology of imagination occupies a special place. To the best of my knowledge, Ricoeur is the only thinker to have paid attention to the above-mentioned paradox explicitly.[4] Yet even though Ricoeur's reflections offer a promising path to refashion the unity of imagination, his position nonetheless suffers from substantial methodological limitations. I will contend that even though Ricoeur resolves the paradox of irreality at the level of productive imagination, he fractures imagination by introducing a new dichotomy, this time between productive and reproductive imagination. This new dichotomy can be overcome by supplementing Ricoeur's hermeneutical turn in phenomenology with a phenomenological turn in hermeneutics, that is, by subjecting Ricoeur's hermeneutics of imagination to a phenomenological critique.

[3] According to Castoriadis, the distinction between these two forms of imagination can already be found in Aristotle's *De Anima* (see Castoriadis 1997: 319f.).

[4] Why does Ricoeur consider this paradox as necessary and irremovable? His most concise answer to this question is to be found in "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling": "On the one hand, imagination entails the *epoché*, the suspension, of the direct reference of thought to the objects of our ordinary discourse. On the other hand, imagination provides *models* for reading reality in a new way. This split structure is the structure of imagination as fiction" (1957, 1978).

To substantiate such a position, I would like to take three steps. First, I will sketch Ricoeur's reasons why no successful resolution has been so far offered to the paradox of irreality. Secondly, I will turn to Ricoeur's solution to the dilemma at hand, indicating what I consider to be both its compelling as well as contentious aspects. Thirdly, I will highlight what I take to be unnecessary hermeneutical limitations that Ricoeur has imposed upon his phenomenology of imagination.

The Reproductive Model of Imagination

According to Ricoeur, the main reason why in the history of philosophy one cannot find explicit analyses of the paradox of irreality derives from a long-standing and deep-rooted prejudice, which invites one to view imagination as the power to generate copies of a pregiven reality. The origins of this prejudice can be traced back not only to ancient philosophical sources, such as Aristotle's *De Anima*, but also to common sense. Besides encountering objects in our perceptual surroundings, we can also imagine them when they are no longer in the perceptual field. Yet how do we see others in portraits, pictures, caricatures, or in mere phantasy? We see them as copies, as replicas of how they either have, or could have, appeared in actuality.

Are we then to say that all imaginary objects are copies of a pregiven reality? Typical counter-examples spring to mind: although the imaginary presentations of a centaur, a siren, or a chimera are by no means uncommon, nobody has ever encountered them in the actual world. Wherefrom do these images and phantasy representations derive? Yet these standard counter-examples are coupled with no-less-standard reservations concerning the productive capacities of imagination. Recall Descartes' well-known argument: the basic elements that compose these imaginary objects are replicas of what we have already encountered in the perceptual world. These basic elements are copies of reality, even though their configurations are new.

Is one then to say that the capacity to create new forms out of pregiven material is the very origin that underlies the constitutive dimension of imagination? Ricoeur resists such an answer. One can reconstruct two reasons for this resistance. First and foremost, in direct contrast to Sartre (see, for instance, 1962: 1), Ricoeur maintains that all experiences, including acoustic, visual, and tactile experiences, are based on a selective enterprise. All experiences are in one form or another "creative," although not creative enough to reconstitute our everyday worlds in accordance with our aspirations, desires, or dreams. Secondly, imagination appears least suitable to perform the constitutive function. In contrast to perceptual objects, all the imaginary objects are marked by irreality. All that is creative about imagination unfolds within the confines of the imaginary worlds, and thus, to follow up on Sartre's famous example, if I imagine my friend Peter getting hit by a car in Berlin, it will be irreal blood that will spill out of his irreal body—a sight accompanied by the irreal despair that will mark the irreal face of the irreal driver. These two reasons invite one to conclude that the reproductive model leaves the constitutive dimension of imagination unexplained.

Thus according to Ricoeur, the reproductive model can only justify the utopian tendency, not the constitutive tendency of imagination. Indeed, if imagination can only reproduce what the subject of experience has encountered in the actual world, then it lacks the resources needed to constitute and reconstitute reality. Such then is Ricoeur's conclusion: if we think of images as copies of reality, then we will end up thinking of imagination as exclusively reproductive and lose all grounds to meaningfully speak of productive imagination.

At this point, let us turn to Ricoeur's alternative—the conceptual framework designed to reconcile the utopian and the constitutive dimensions of imagination. As we will see, Ricoeur's alternative will prove to be a necessary detour that will enable us to revisit Ricoeur's critique of the reproductive model of imagination.

The Productive Model of Imagination

Reproductive imagination forms an almost exhaustive horizon of reflections on imagination in the history of philosophy. I say "almost" because one cannot ignore either Aristotle's analysis of tragedy[5] or Kant's reflections on productive imagination in the First and the Third Critiques.[6] Yet according to Ricoeur, the subsequent philosophical reflections on imagination have overlooked the far-reaching significance of productive imagination in Aristotle's thought. As far as Kant's notion of productive imagination is concerned, Ricoeur surprisingly finds it less far-reaching than that of Aristotle's. This is because while Kant's reflections on productive imagination in the First Critique were exclusively guided by questions concerning the possibility of cognition of empirical objects, in the Third Critique, productive imagination was conceived as entirely subjective, merely tied to aesthetic judgment and thus without any effect on reality (see in this regard Taylor 2006: 97). Within the Kantian framework, imagination cannot augment the empirical reality that we already inhabit.

Following in Aristotle's and Kant's footsteps, Ricoeur himself has sought to thematize a hermeneutical alternative to the reproductive model of imagination within four frameworks: that of poetic imagination, epistemological imagination, socio-political imagination, and religious imagination.[7] Since Ricoeur's analysis of poetic imagination constitutes the theoretical foundation that underlies his

[5] Ricoeur interprets Aristotle's portrayal of tragedy as the earliest account of productive imagination. In the words of George Taylor, "for Aristotle, the tragedy is not a copy or reduplication of human life but on the contrary has a 'power of disclosure concerning reality.' Aristotle's conception of imagination is thus directed against Plato's notion of imagination as a shadow" (2006: 96).

[6] There are two different notions of productive imagination is Kant's works. In the *First Critique*, productive imagination is meant to synthesize concepts and intuitions. By contrast, in the *Third Critique* productive imagination strives for the beyond, even though it fails to be adequate to it. George Taylor remarks that in the Lectures on Imagination Ricoeur addresses both notions of productive imagination in Kant. As Taylor goes on to say, "[a]greeing with Gadamer that cognition and aesthetics should not remain separated, Ricoeur considers the task after Kant is to build a unified concept of imagination that brings the cognitive and aesthetic dimensions together" (2013b: 6).

[7] Ricoeur presents such a fourfold typology in his *Lectures on Imagination*, which at the moment are being prepared for publication.

investigations of all other forms of imagination,[8] in my following reflections I will exclusively focus on poetic imagination.

Besides thinking of images as though they were replicas of a pregiven reality, we can also think of them as though they were fictions. One can clarify the difference between replicas and fiction by juxtaposing two forms of nothingness—the nothingness of *absence* and the nothingness of *non-existence* (see Ricoeur 1979: 126). To think of imaginary objects as replicas is to think of them as absent: these objects could be present, yet they are not. By contrast, to think of imaginary objects as fictions is to conceive of them as non-existent: for principle reasons, these objects could not manifest themselves in our actual experience.[9]

Although fictions do not refer to reality in a reproductive fashion, they do not lose all reference to reality. According to one of the central points of Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination, fictions refer to reality in a productive, i.e., constitutive way. This is what Ricoeur calls "the paradox of fiction" (1979: 127): "knowing how to abandon the real, fiction also 'knows' how to (re)constitute it".[10]

It is important to emphasize that, according to Ricoeur, the dialectical structure of fiction is *language-based* (see, for instance, 1979: 127, 1991: 121), and it is precisely this structure that accounts for the possibility of productive imagination. In Ricoeur's view, to make sense of the paradox of fiction one needs to conceptualize imagination in a novel framework—not that of perception, but rather that of language. One needs to think of images not as pale copies of perceptions, but as intuitive fulfillments that can accompany the metaphorical use of language. Such, then, is Ricoeur's thesis: a hermeneutical theory of metaphor can provide the fundamental clarification of the productive dimension of imagination (1977: 173–216).

So as to understand the reasoning that underlies this claim, let us consider the metaphorical expression "time is a thief" as our guiding example. Although at the literal level, this expression is meaningless, the goal of the listener is to intend meaning where, literally, there is none. For this to take place, the listener must experience a clash between essentially different semantic fields. This is what Ricoeur, building on the basis of Jean Cohen's analysis (see 1977: 194), calls "predicative impertinence"—an experience of a shock, which in its own turn invites the subject to search for ways to liberate herself from it. The attempt to liberate oneself from this shock is experienced as the endeavor to restructure one's semantic

[8] As George Taylor remarks in "Ricoeur's Lectures on Imagination," "Ricoeur's main thesis in the *Lectures on Imagination* is that the productive imagination can most prototypically be found in fiction" (2013a: 6). Or as Ricoeur himself puts it in these lectures, "[b]ecause fictions don't reproduce a previous reality, they may produce a new reality. They are not bound by an original that precedes them" (quoted from Taylor 2013a, op. cit.).

[9] One could of course argue that such a clarification remains imprecise: it invites one to think of such imaginary creatures as unicorns, sirens, or the above-mentioned centaurs and chimaeras, as though they were fictive objects. However, purely imaginary beings are built out of the very same materials that we encounter in the perceptual world. In this expanded sense, they exemplify reproductive rather than productive imagination, which conceives of images as replicas of the given reality.

[10] Or as George Taylor puts it: "productive imagination discloses new forms of reality; it augments reality…. [P]roductive imagination is the *manifestation* of new reality rather than simply *adequation* to existing reality" (2013b: 5).

field and to grasp meaning at the very core of the immediate semantic meaninglessness. We understand metaphors only insofar as we overcome the original meaninglessness and reconstitute meaning on the basis of the restructured semantic field. On the basis of such a restructuring, we learn how to *see* time as a thief, an enemy as a wolf, or sunrise as a new beginning. We learn how to interpret expressions as meaningful even though they are *literally* meaningless. Yet what is this power that enables one to make sense of the metaphorical use of language? It is nothing other than productive imagination. As Ricoeur maintains, "imagination is the apperception, the sudden insight, of a new predicative pertinence, specifically a pertinence within impertinence" (1979: 131).

Thus to understand a metaphor one needs to produce predicative compatibility on the grounds of a more primitive predicative incompatibility. This does not mean that the production of a novel predicative compatibility erases the former incompatibility. Rather, to understand a metaphor is to see meaning while still retaining the sense of a more original meaninglessness. This grounding of harmony in disharmony enables one to grasp the essential difference between metaphorical and literal uses of language. In contrast to metaphorical meaning, literal meaning invokes no tension between the substrate and the predicate, word and sentence, sentence and paragraph, etc.

Although Ricoeur's hermeneutical account of the genesis of metaphor is a highly significant contribution to our understanding of metaphor and imagination at large, it also introduces a deep-seated ambiguity, which Ricoeur has not managed to dispel. On the one hand, when Ricoeur writes that "images are spoken before they are seen" (1979: 129), or when he intimates that images are not derived from perception, but rather from language (1979: 129), he invites one to interpret his hermeneutical approach as a suggestion that language constitutes the origin of all imagination, be it productive or reproductive. On the other hand, Ricoeur's admission that imagination resting upon the metaphorical use of language "is doubtlessly the productive, schematizing imagination" (1979: 132), as well as his more reserved proclamation that "we *see* some images only to the extent that we first *hear* them" (1979: 134), suggests something quite different, viz., that language constitutes the origin of productive, not reproductive, imagination. As the quoted passages show, one can derive textual evidence to support both readings. However, as far as the actual arguments are concerned, the second reading is more compelling, if only because it does not deny the plain fact that imagination does not always and necessarily rely upon language.[11]

[11] At this point, one might object that Ricoeur need not subscribe to such a narrow conception of language as the one I have attributed to him in my analysis. Since not only Husserl's but also Heidegger's influence on Ricoeur's thought is undeniable, should one not broaden the conception of language in a Heideggerian fashion by conceiving of language as the "house of Being," i.e., as that which allows for meaningful being-in-the-world? Yet as soon as language is conceived in such a broad way, Ricoeur's conception of productive imagination loses its *specificity* and *legitimacy*. It loses its specificity because it becomes no longer clear how one is to distinguish between productive and reproductive imagination, for clearly, both forms of imaginations unfold within the horizon of Dasein's meaningful being-in-the-world. It also loses its legitimacy, since as soon as language is conceived in the broad hermeneutical way, it no longer becomes clear why productive imagination is to be grounded in a theory of metaphor.

Thus my following analysis is grounded upon the conjecture that Ricoeur sees the rootedness of imagination in metaphorical language as a peculiarity of productive imagination. While for Kant productive imagination was meant to provide an image for a concept, for Ricoeur the function of productive imagination is to generate images that accompany the metaphorical use of language.[12] Put in phenomenological terms, the task of productive imagination is that of bringing metaphorical expressions to their intuitive fulfillment. Yet what is brought to fulfillment remains bound to language, and so as to emphasize this founded nature of productive imagination, Ricoeur draws a distinction between "free" and "bound" images (see 1977: 211, 1979: 133), understanding the difference between them in a twofold way. First, while free images can be seen before they are spoken, bound images must be spoken before they are seen. In short, bound images are bound to language. Secondly, while free images are characteristic of reproductive imagination, bound images are typical of productive imagination.

What exactly does it mean to see the world as a stage or to drown in a sea of grief? First and foremost, it is to have bound images, which means that these images are founded upon the metaphorical use of language. Moreover, to see an image as a bound image is not merely to see this or that thing, but rather to *see-something-as-something-other-than-it-is*. Within the horizon of a perception, to see-something-as-something-other-than-it-is is to suffer from illusory consciousness. By contrast, imaginary consciousness is not illusory. Imaginary consciousness neutralizes the reality of its object by lifting it out of the actual world. The imaginary seeing-something-*as-something-else* unfolds within an irreal world that is lifted above the actual one. Imagination is the power that enables the subject of experience to constitute such an irreal world. So as to highlight this irreal horizon of productive imagination, Ricoeur speaks of "a sort of *epoché* of the real," of the "state of non-engagement" and a "neutralized atmosphere" (1979: 134). Within such a bracketed framework, the subject of experience obtains the freedom not only to devise new metaphors, but also to try out new ideas and values.

The *epoché* of the real constitutes only the first step that the metaphorical employment of language enables one to take. The second step, if taken, is far more important as far as the full-fledged significance of productive imagination is concerned. Having escaped the confines of reality, productive imagination can also offer its re-description. With this second step in mind, we come to face the central thesis of Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology of imagination: "This positive function of fiction, of which the *epoché* is the negative condition, is only understood when the fecundity of the imagination is clearly linked to that of language, as exemplified by the metaphorical process" (1979: 134).

Pre-predicative Imagination and the Genesis of Metaphors

Ricoeur's emphasis on the primacy of language in the framework of his philosophy of imagination is meant to replace the primacy that classical phenomenology, from

[12] As Ricoeur puts it in the context of his analysis of Paul Henle's theory of metaphor, "if metaphor adds nothing to the description of the world, at least it adds to the way in which we perceive; and this is the poetic function of metaphor" (1977: 190).

Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, has granted to pre-predicative experience. Without recognizing the primacy of language, we will continue to limit imagination to its reproductive function and thus fail to take into account productive imagination. For this very reason, the guiding question that underlies Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination reads as follows: "But if an image is not derived from perception, how can it be derived from language?" (1991: 121)

This shift from perception to language underlies Ricoeur's understanding of the paradox of irreality. In the hermeneutical framework, the utopian tendency turns out to be a necessary detour that imagination takes so as to fulfill its constitutive function. The utopian tendency turns out to be a peculiar *epoché* of the real, without which a novel description of reality would not be possible. Yet surprisingly, such an understanding of the paradox in question relies upon the introduction of a new rupture at the heart of imagination, the rupture between reproductive and productive imagination.

Thus one needs to ask, is it really true that perception and language constitute two irreconcilable origins of images? The answer appears self-evident insofar as productive imagination is identified with fiction and insofar as fiction is conceived as an exclusively linguistic achievement. Yet besides being the ground that underlies our capacity to re-describe reality, is fiction not also an accomplishment that itself rests upon more rudimentary presuppositions, which ultimately reach back to pre-predicative experience?

In what follows, I would like to subject the central tenet of Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination to a phenomenological critique. My critique is geared toward the establishment of two closely related claims. First of all, I want to contend that metaphor is not the ultimate ground of productive imagination. Rather, the metaphorical employment of language itself relies upon more basic intuitive capacities, which antedate and motivate the genesis of metaphors. The second thesis directly springs from the first one: not being the ground of productive imagination, metaphor is to be conceived as one particular figure of productive imagination. Since these two issues are closely related to each other, I will address them alongside each other.

Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination is built upon a theory of metaphor, which is focused upon how metaphors are read, heard, and understood. By posing the question in such a manner, one presupposes the givenness of metaphors without inquiring into their generation. In a sense, such a strategy is understandable: we are all born into particular languages, which are not of our own making and which are metaphorical through and through. For this reason alone, we have always already come across metaphors and understood them before we have obtained the capacity to devise them. According to such an argument, our capacity to generate metaphors is reproductive of our more basic ability to understand them. Thus, it seems that "images are spoken [or better, *heard*] before they are seen" (Ricoeur 1991: 121).

Nonetheless, even if one accepts this line of reasoning, one cannot avoid asking, what exactly is involved in this process of reproducibility? Clearly, it cannot be just a question of blindly introducing semantic impertinence with an empty hope that on this basis alone one will come to broaden one's semantic field and establish a new

type of semantic pertinence. Clearly, there must be a certain guiding sense that underlies the generation of metaphors. Using phenomenological vocabulary, one could describe this guiding sense as a particular kind of intention, which can be either fulfilled or disappointed. The metaphorical process is born out of a specific kind of speechless intention, which strives to be fulfilled in language, even though no literal expression can bring it to fulfillment. In this context, it is helpful to recall Aristotle's observation at the end of *Poetics*: "The greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one things that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an *intuitive perception* of the similarity in dissimilars" (2001, 1459a 5–8 [my emphasis]).[13] For Aristotle, without intuitive perception, there would be no metaphors. In a good sense, and in direct contrast to Ricoeur, *we see images before we speak them*.

While Ricoeur's essays on the philosophy of imagination bypass the question concerning the genesis of metaphors, in *The Rule of Metaphor*, Ricoeur turns to this question on a few occasions. First, in the context of his critique of Roman Jakobson (1977:174–180), Ricoeur maintains that a semiotic theory, which conceives of metaphor as a substitution of one term for another, is incapable of taking into account the difference between newly invented metaphors and metaphors in common use. Jakobson understands the use of metaphors as a selection of a particular term from a pool of various terms, a substitution that is based on similarity. To this Ricoeur responds: "In order that selection [of different terms] itself be free, it must result from an original combination created by the context and therefore distinct from pre-formed combinations within the code" (1977: 180). What is the combination of images to which Ricoeur here refers and what is the context of which he here speaks? Ricoeur's goal is not to return from a semiotic account of language to pre-predicative experience, but rather to offer reasons to supplement the semiotic account with a semantic account of discourse. It is the latter, not the former, that can account for the newly invented metaphors. However, in the whole corpus of his works, Ricoeur never provides a detailed account of how discourse can be conceived as the ground for the generation of metaphors.

In fact, one could argue that Ricoeur himself provides good reasons to reject the claim that discourse constitutes the origin of metaphors. This brings us to the second occasion on which in *The Rule of Metaphor*, Ricoeur turns to the generation of metaphors. This time we are faced with Ricoeur's argument that resemblance is both a cause and an effect of metaphor. According to Ricoeur, one can only appreciate such an overwhelming role of resemblance if one takes into account the inherently paradoxical nature of metaphor. To clarify the paradox in question, Ricoeur maintains that just as there is no metaphor without seeing the similar, so also no seeing of the similar is possible without its construction (see 1977: 195). This coupling of seeing and constructing invites one to concede that the origins of metaphor themselves lie in pre-predicative experience. One is invited to admit that a perceptual intuiting of the similar is what initiates the generation of metaphors: this perceptual intuiting lacks fullness and precision, which can only be derived from

[13] For Ricoeur's analysis of this passage, see Ricoeur (1977: 192, 1978: 144).

language. Yet Ricoeur is quick to dismiss such a possibility.[14] He maintains that if seeing and constructing are necessary elements of the generation of metaphors, then this generation must be inherently discursive. But if so, then the metaphorical process must begin not with seeing but rather with constructing, which Ricoeur ultimately understands as a poetic enterprise. Yet this conclusion simply does not follow and the reasons why one should favor it remain unexplained. Moreover, this conclusion undermines the very thesis that Ricoeur wants to establish, namely, the thesis that resemblance is not only an effect, but also the cause that underlies the generation of metaphors.

Ricoeur's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, there are good reasons to maintain that not only language-based, but also pre-predicative imagination can be reproductive and productive. So as to provide this claim with further support, allow me to introduce three structural analogies between the two types of imagination.

First, as we saw, to constitute a metaphor, one must reach out for the elements of language and assemble them in a way that at the literal level lacks semantic justification. I would argue that this capacity to assemble divergent elements of language parallels the capacity to assemble divergent elements of pre-predicative imagination. Here I am alluding to the constitution of such imaginary objects as centaurs or chimeras, a constitution that is based on imagination's capacity to assemble perceptual elements in a way that lacks "perceptual justification". Is it not one and the same power of imagination that manifests itself in diverse frameworks of experience? And is the unity that binds pre-predicative and language-based imagination not obscured by Ricoeur's sharp distinction between productive and reproductive imagination?

One might object that while pre-predicative imagination is only capable of constituting imaginary objects, language-based imagination constitutes fictive scenarios and scenes; and for this reason, the identification of pre-predicative imagination with reproductive imagination and of language-based imagination with productive imagination is not only legitimate but also necessary. This objection brings us to the second analogy. It is important to stress that pre-predicative imagination is constitutive not only of irreal objects, but also of imaginary scenes. Basic examples should suffice: when I am exhausted, I can picture myself on the beach, enjoying the water, sand and sun; when I find my surroundings tedious, I can picture myself in an unfamiliar city, strolling through its beautiful streets, etc. The capacity to picture imaginary scenes is also built upon a peculiar *epoché*; it also presupposes a "state of non-engagement" and a "neutralized atmosphere," which Ricoeur describes as a characteristic feature of productive imagination.

Thirdly, not only language-based but also pre-predicative imagination can perform both the utopian and the constitute functions. Still at the level of pre-predicative imagination, the "*epoché* of the real" now-and-again turns out to be the negative condition that underlies the productive role of imagination, which allows us to reconstitute our daily reality. Not only the utopian, but also the constitutive function of imagination can manifest itself at the level of pre-predicative

[14] In his "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling," Ricoeur calls such a possibility "bad psychology" (1978: 155), interpreting it in a Humean rather than in a phenomenological way.

imagination that still lacks linguistic articulation. One is thereby invited to resist Ricoeur's sharp distinction between pre-predicative and language-based imagination and contend that fiction is an elaborate and sophisticated form of productive imagination, whose roots can be traced back to the basic capacity to reconfigure the material that we borrow from our actual experience.

The Paradox of Irreality Revisited

I early on asked, how is one to understand the capacity of imagination to pull us out of the confines of the real, transpose us into the irreal horizon that is cut off from actuality, alongside its other capacity to (re)constitute actuality? One cannot recognize the full force of imagination if one does not show how imagination can perform such seemingly contradictory functions. To the best of my knowledge, Ricoeur is the only thinker to have addressed this paradox explicitly. According to Ricoeur, what I have identified above as the utopian element of imagination is a necessary negative condition that underlies its constitutive force. Without being utopian, imagination could not be constitutive.

Ricoeur restores the unity of imagination that the paradox of irreality threatened to disrupt, yet simultaneously, he disrupts this unity at a deeper level by introducing a seemingly irreconcilable breach between productive and reproductive imagination. Ricoeur takes away with one hand what he has given with the other: he overcomes the dichotomy between utopian and constitutive tendencies of the imagination, yet not without simultaneously introducing another dichotomy between reproductive and productive imagination.

In this regard, one is taken aback by a strange lack of parallelism between Ricoeur's accounts of poetic imagination and socio-cultural imagination. In the framework of Ricoeur's account of the socio-cultural imagination, utopia exemplifies productive imagination, while ideology represents reproductive imagination. As Ricoeur argues in his *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (1986), just as there is no ideology without utopia, so also there is no utopia without ideology. Yet strangely, when it comes to poetic imagination, a similar kind of dialectic between productive and reproductive imagination is missing. Given this lack of parallelism, Ricoeur's clarification of the paradox of irreality at the level of poetic imagination is regrettably restrictive. It enables one to make sense of the paradox in question, yet only within the language-based sphere. When it comes to dreams, daydreaming or non-language based art, such as painting, dance, or music, the hermeneutical justification appears to be ungrounded.[15]

[15] To avoid misunderstanding, I should note that Ricoeur himself emphasizes that productive imagination manifests itself outside the language-based sphere. For instance, in his *Lectures on Imagination*, he refers to impressionism as a movement that embodies productive imagination. Impressionism created "a new alphabet of colors capable of capturing the transient and fleeting with the magic of hidden correspondences. And once more reality was remade" (Ricoeur, "Lectures on Imagination," 17:15 [Quoted from Taylor 2006: 96–97]). Yet how exactly is one to reconcile this non-linguistic power of productive imagination with Ricoeur's explicit emphasis that productive imagination is grounded in the metaphorical use of language? To the best of my knowledge, Ricoeur does not respond to this question.

My critical engagement in Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology of imagination was meant to broaden the horizon of hermeneutical reflections and thereby lend the hermeneutical insights greater significance. With this goal in mind, I argued that experience itself invites one to concede that the dialectic between the utopian and the constitutive tendencies is to be found not only at the level of language-based, but also at the level of pre-predicative imagination.

Allow me to illustrate this by turning to affective consciousness[16] and thereby returning to *The Last Temptation of Christ*. Spinoza, who recognized the affective significance of will and reason, famously maintained that "no affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect" (2002: 553). One can take this to mean that, according to Spinoza, if particular affects are to be overcome, they will be overcome not through pure will or pure reason, but rather through other affects, including intellectual joy (see Loydd 2008: 212). As Kathleen Lennon has put it in her brief commentary on this passage, "we cannot change people's way of looking at the world simply by offering them contrary facts. We need to offer them *alternative pictures* which make emotional and not just cognitive sense" (Lennon 2010: 387 [my emphasis]).

The expression "alternative pictures" is quite telling. Since pictures lack linguistic articulation, the expression suggests that the accomplishments of pre-predicative imagination have not just utopian, but also constitutive powers. By implication, if language-based imagination is constitutive as well (which it certainly is), then it entails the same powers that already lurk at the level of pre-predicative imagination.

Thus within the framework of a phenomenological analysis of imagination, one can understand Spinoza's claim as follows: a pre-predicative presentation, which triggers one's passions and emotions in an immediate way, already entails affective and constitutive force. A pre-predicative presentation, which at first glance appears to be nothing more than a copy of a pregiven reality, has the affective power to (re)constitute our socio-cultural worlds. Isn't this the very thing one fears when one fears imagination? And does the tacit recognition of this state of affairs not underlie one's unwillingness to salute the freedom of imagination as though it were nothing more than an innocent force, without any capacity to affect our actual worlds and actual experiences?

Not only language-based but also pre-predicative imagination has the power to lift the subject of experience out of the domain of everyday reality. One could metaphorically describe the utopian tendency of both pre-predicative and language-based imagination as a move of a pendulum swing. On the one hand, it is a retreat that can be followed by a return. On the other hand, the retreat in question might very well be interrupted mid-air: having transposed the subject into the irreal world,

[16] For Ricoeur's own account of the affective dimensions of imagination, see especially Ricoeur (1978: 155–158). Here Ricoeur distances himself from those theories, which ascribe a merely substitutive role to affection. According to these theories, imagination in general, and metaphor in particular, lack informative value, yet they cover up this lack with "informationless" imagery. In contrast to such a view, Ricoeur argues that affection is irreducibly cognitive. To put the matter in the terms I have employed in this paper, affection is *constitutive*.

it need not manifest its effects upon reality. Yet how could anyone know in advance if the constitutive element will follow the utopian one? An answer to this question would rely upon prior knowledge of all the configurations of sense that the world could possibly take on. At least for the finite beings that we are, such knowledge is unattainable. Such being the case, it becomes understandable how one and the same force can enable one to escape and to build, to flee and to form, to suspend and to constitute. Moreover, it becomes also understandable how one and the same force can be seen as both innocent and threatening.

Concluding Remarks

In place of a conclusion, I would like to touch upon two implications that follow from the foregoing analysis. The first implication concerns one of the most common claims made about Ricoeur's philosophy in general. According to this claim, Ricoeur is the philosopher who grafts hermeneutics onto phenomenology. I do not want to question the significance of such a philosophical endeavor. I do want to suggest, though, that Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology presents us with an ongoing task and not with a finished accomplishment. Moreover, we are faced here with an endeavor, which in some frameworks has not been successfully carried through. My foregoing analysis shows that when it comes to the philosophy of imagination, Ricoeur's analysis fluctuates between the phenomenological and hermeneutical alternatives, without successfully resolving the tensions between them. Moreover, my analysis also shows that in the framework of his philosophy of imagination, Ricoeur does not graft hermeneutics onto phenomenology; quite on the contrary, he strives to graft phenomenology onto hermeneutics.[17] Thus, on the one hand, following hermeneutical principles, Ricoeur dismisses the phenomenological claims regarding the primacy of pre-predicative experience: his philosophy of imagination presupposes the primacy of language. On the other hand, following phenomenological principles, Ricoeur also maintains that philosophical accounts of imagination are accounts of different kinds of *seeing-as*, which Ricoeur thematizes as the conceptual unity of consciousness of sense and consciousness of images, and which he further qualifies as the sensible aspect of language itself (1977: 212f.). One of my goals was to show that the tensions between these philosophical orientations continue to resonate in his philosophy of the imagination. These tensions leave us with the task of reconceptualizing the relation between phenomenology and hermeneutics. More precisely, one needs to rethink whether it is in fact possible to graft one tradition onto the other, or whether in some frameworks of analysis the

[17] As Thomas Busch observes in the essay I have referred to above, "Ricoeur's interest in imagination came at a time when his thought was moving from a phenomenological to a hermeneutic methodology in which problems of language supplanted problems of consciousness" (1997: 514). Thus Ricoeur does not thematize imagination in the framework of a phenomenological analysis of pre-predicative experience, but rather turns to imagination in the framework of different types of language use. Such a methodological reorientation justifies the claim that when it comes to his philosophy of the imagination, Ricoeur grafts phenomenology onto hermeneutics and not hermeneutics onto phenomenology.

traditions in question might not constitute two alternative paths, which now and again might lead in significantly different directions.

The second implication concerns my contention that the origins of productive imagination already lurk at the level of pre-predicative experience, i.e., at the level of perception's capacity to reconfigure pre-given material and thus to give rise to perceptual images of non-existent "things". This realization motivates one to return to the very questions concerning perception and imagination that occupied a central place in classical phenomenological reflections. More precisely, we are once again led to ask, what exactly is perception and where exactly is one to locate its limits, the recognition of which would enable one to distinguish perception from memory, anticipation, phantasy, and image-consciousness? And correlatively, what exactly is imagination, and where are its limits, which make it possible to distinguish it from other related forms of intentional consciousness? Ricoeur's repeated insistence that there is no such thing as pure perception (i.e., that perception is always shot through with imagination[18]) provides a further impetus to address these questions.

As Ricoeur once put it, "thought does not like what is new and does its best to reduce the new to the old" (1979: 125). Let me conclude by saying that if one is to open up a fresh dialogue between phenomenology and hermeneutics, one must do so by turning back to classical phenomenological problems, which in the purported grafting of hermeneutics onto phenomenology have remained either suppressed or overlooked.

References

Aristotle. (2001). Poetics. In R. McKeon (Ed.), *The basic works of aristotle*. New York: The Modern Library.

Bachelard, G. (1994). *The poetics of space* (Maria Jolas, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.

Busch, T. (1997). Sartre and Ricoeur on imagination. *The American Catholic philosophical quarterly, LXX*(4), 507–518.

Castoriadis, C. (1997). Radical imagination and the social instituting imaginary. *The Castoriadis reader* (pp. 319–337). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Green, J., & Karolides, N. (2009). *Encyclopedia of censorship*. New York: Infobase Publishing.

Husserl, E. (1970). *The Crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology* (David C., Trans.) Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Husserl, E. (2005). *Phantasy, image-consciousness, and memory in 1898–1925* (Brough J. B., Trans.). Dordrecht: Springer.

Kazantsakis, N. (1998). *The last temptation of Christ* (Bien P. A., Trans.). New York: Scribner Paperback Fiction.

Lennon, K. (2010). Re-enchanting the world: The role of imagination in perception. *Philosophy, 85*(3), 375–389.

Levy, L. (2014). Sartre and Ricoeur on productive imagination. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 52*(1), 43–60.

Lloydd, G. (2008). *Providence lost*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[18] As Ricoeur puts it in his *Lectures on Imagination*, "[w]e can no longer oppose … imagining to seeing, if seeing is itself a away of imagining, interpreting, or thinking" (Ricoeur, *Lectures on Imagination*, 9:1 [Quoted from Taylor 2006: 94]).

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1993a). Cézanne's doubt. In G. Johnson (Ed.), *The Merleau-Ponty aesthetics reader: philosophy and painting* (pp. 59–75) (M. Smith. Evanston, Trans.). Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1993b). Eye and Mind. In G. Johnson (Ed.), *The Merleau-Ponty aesthetics reader: philosophy and painting* (pp. 121–149). (M. Smith. Evanston, Trans.). Illinois: Northwestern University Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1977). *The rule of metaphor* (R. Czerny, Trans.). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1978). The metaphorical process as cognition, imagination and feeling. *Critical Inquiry, 5*(1), 143–159.

Ricoeur, P. (1979). The function of fiction in shaping reality. *Man and World, 12*(2), 123–141.

Ricoeur, P. (1986). In G. Taylor (Ed.), *Lectures on ideology and utopia*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1991). Imagination in discourse and action (K. Blamey & J. B. Thompson, Trans.). *From text to action* (pp. 168–87) Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Sartre, J. P. (1962). *The imagination* (F. Williams, Trans.). Ann Arbot: The University of Michigan Press.

Sartre, J. P. (2004). *The imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination.* (J. Webber, Trans.). New York: Routledge.

Spinoza, B. (2002). In M. L. Morgan. (Ed.), (S. Shirley, Trans.). *Complete works*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Stawarska, B. (2005). Defining imagination: Sartre between Husserl and Janet. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4*, 133–153.

Taylor, G. (2006). Ricoeur's philosophy of imagination. *Journal of French Philosophy, 16*(1), 93–104.

Taylor, G. (2013a). Ricoeur's lectures on imagination, keynote presentation at the conference, *Paul Ricoeur et la philosophie contemporaine de langue anglaise*, Paris, Nov. 20.

Taylor, G. (2013b). Prospective Identity. In F. Nascimento & W. Salles (Eds.). *Ética, Identidade e Reconhecimento Na Obra de Paul Ricoeur*. Editora PUC-Rio & Ediçoes Loyola.